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Abstract
We study Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policy in an economy with financial frictions and
sovereign default in the form endogenously determined haircuts on outstanding debt.
Government bonds facilitate tax smoothing, but also provide collateral and liquidity ser-
vices that mitigate financial frictions. There exists a debt Laffer curve, which induces the
government to issue bonds to a point where marginal debt has negative welfare effects.
Debt positions in the order of magnitude of annual output remain sustainable despite the
option to default. When default happens, liquidity on the bond market is impaired, which
can trigger extended periods of recurrent haircuts.
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The sustainability of public debt has become a serious concern to investors and policy-makers
during the recent financial crisis. Fears of sovereign default and the associated rising borrowing
costs have forced several European countries into severe fiscal austerity measures. In the United
States, concerns about the sustainability of public debt have featured prominently in the recent
debate on the fiscal cliff. They are also prevalent in Japan, which faces the highest debt-to-GDP
ratio among OECD countries.
The countries referred to above are developed economies where a substantial fraction of
government debt is held domestically. The recurrent concerns about their debt sustainability
indicate that the incentives of governments to default on debt held by domestic residents are
not yet well understood. This is partly due to the scarcity of recent historical default episodes
in advanced economies, but also due to the scarcity of relevant theoretical quantitative studies.
Indeed, the literature on sovereign default has mainly studied the sustainability of external debt
in developing economies – the empirically relevant case before the crisis.1 The (normative) fiscal
policy literature, in turn, has focused on the determination of taxes and domestic government
debt in environments with and without commitment, yet abstracting from the possibility of
outright government default.2 In the present paper we address this shortcoming by introducing
fractional default as a policy instrument into a closed-economy model of optimal discretionary
fiscal policy.3 We examine optimal default policies and their interaction with government
spending, tax and debt policies. We are particularly interested in (i) the determination of the
1Prominent examples include Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), and Arellano (2008).
2Important papers are Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey (1983), Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala
(2002), Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2008).
3Our approach of modelling domestically-held government debt subject to the the risk of fractional haircuts
differentiates our work from most previous research on sovereign default. Both features have empirical support.
See e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) on the importance of domestic government debt, and Cruces and Trebesch
(2013) on the incidence of fractional haircuts in sovereign debt restructuring.
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long-run level of government debt and its sustainability under the option to default, (ii) the
optimal size of haircuts, and (iii) the dynamics of debt during default episodes.
Our core framework is the classic closed-economy model of Lucas and Stokey (1983) aug-
mented with endogenous government spending as in Debortoli and Nunes (2013). We extend
this framework in several dimensions. First, we introduce financial frictions into the economy’s
production sector: Firms must finance their wage bill in advance using collateralised loans;
and the scale of profitable investment projects is limited by entrepreneurs’ access to external
finance. This generates a role for government debt as collateral and as private liquidity (cf.
Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998). Second, in line with the open-economy literature on sovereign
debt (e.g. Arellano, 2008), we introduce a fixed reputational cost of defaulting by assuming
temporary disruptions of the market for government debt following a default event. Finally, we
consider aggregate uncertainty in the form of a disaster shock to labour productivity. Starting
from this extended environment, our paper provides a coherent theory establishing financial
frictions as a single force driving both the accumulation of public debt and its sustainability.
We find that the steady state level of debt in our model is strictly positive and sizeable (84%
of output in our baseline calibration), unlike in earlier models that predict negative or zero long-
run debt (e.g. Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala, 2002).4 This property is owed to the role
of government bonds in mitigating financial frictions. Notably, the banking sector’s demand
for collateral is fully satiated in the steady state, that is, at the margin debt accumulation is
driven only by the trade-off between the liquidity demand for government bonds and the tax
4Alternative theories that rationalise positive long-run debt rest on political frictions (Persson and Svensson,
1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), monetary-fiscal interactions (Ellison and Rankin, 2007; Diaz-Gimenez,
Giovannetti, Marimon, and Teles, 2008; Martin, 2009) or simply the government’s relative impatience as in the
literature on external sovereign debt and default.
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distortions associated with a higher debt burden. We further find that the government’s debt
policy is subject to a Laffer curve. The issuance of an extra unit of debt reduces collateral
and liquidity premia and thus raises the interest rate costs of the entire inframarginal quantity
of debt. When debt is scarce this effect is particularly strong and issuing more debt actually
generates less revenue for the government. These dynamics on the ‘bad’ side of the debt Laffer
curve are the flip side of the positive welfare effects of marginal debt: The economy is on the
‘bad’ (‘good’) side of the debt Laffer curve precisely when marginal debt has positive (negative)
welfare effects. This induces the government to accumulate sufficient debt to escape the ‘bad’
side of the debt Laffer curve, that is, to build up debt to a point beyond the welfare-maximizing
level.
The government’s optimal haircut policy takes into account the repercussions for financial
intermediation resulting from a (partial) default on government bonds. Endogenous costs of
default arise due to the post-default scarcity of debt and are thus proportional to the size of
the imposed haircut. While the government is not forced to run a balanced budget during a
default episode, we assume that public debt ceases to be tradeable on secondary markets. This
reputational cost of default has a fixed-cost character. The government balances the fixed and
variable costs of default against the additional tax distortions under full repayment. Since the
latter are increasing in debt, there is a maximum sustainable level of debt, a fiscal limit. For
debt levels exceeding the fiscal limit the discretionary government exercises its default option.
In our calibrated economy the fiscal limit is in the order of magnitude of annual output and
the optimal haircut amounts to approximately 45%.
Finally, we examine the dynamics of debt and the government’s repayment policy during a
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default episode. We show that equilibrium default occurs in the form of a series of recurrent
haircuts: As long as the market for government debt remains disrupted in the aftermath of an
initial default, the government repays its debt only partially. Only when the secondary market
trading of public debt is resumed, the government ‘graduates’ from default and the economy
converges back towards its long-run steady state.
Our work is related to a number of recent papers that study the determination of public
debt under optimal discretionary fiscal policy, though without default. In a model without
capital and with exogenous government expenditure, Krusell, Martin, and Rios-Rull (2006)
uncover a multiplicity of steady states that depend on initial conditions and are thus similar
to those under full commitment. Considering endogenous government expenditure instead,
Debortoli and Nunes (2013) establish convergence to zero long-run debt as a robust outcome
driven by the government’s interest rate manipulation motive. Our model nests their economy
as a special case and inherits a generalised interest rate manipulation motive. Moreover, we
consider outright default as part of the optimal policy mix and study the sustainability of public
debt.
This focus on debt sustainability is also central to the vast literature on external sovereign
debt and default. There, debt is held externally, fiscal policy is largely absent, governments
decide about default in a discretionary fashion, and costs of default are exogenous. Notable
recent exceptions include the studies by Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) who examine
the role of fiscal policy, Mendoza and Yue (2012) who assess business cycle implications in an
environment with endogenous default costs, and Adam and Grill (2012) who analyze optimal
sovereign default as the solution to a Ramsey plan. Moreover, Yue (2010) and Arellano, Mateos-
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Planas, and Rios-Rull (2013) have recently analyzed aspects of partial default emerging under
debt renegotiation or as an expensive alternative to new borrowing in the context of models
with exogenous costs of default.
Strategic default on domestic government debt has recently been studied by D’Erasmo and
Mendoza (2012), Juessen and Schabert (2012), Sosa-Padilla (2012) and Pouzo (2013). However,
different from our paper, D’Erasmo and Mendoza (2012) focus on redistributive implications.
Juessen and Schabert (2012) consider a setup with risk-neutral agents and exogenous default
costs. Similar to our approach, Sosa-Padilla (2012) invokes a working capital constraint to
generate endogenous default costs, but the government’s default decision is binary and debt
is again priced by risk-neutral agents. Pouzo (2013) proceeds under the assumption that the
government can commit to its tax policy but not to the repayment of outstanding debt; different
from our model, default triggers a temporary breakdown of the primary bond market, but
debt continues to be traded on secondary markets and hence retains a positive valuation in
anticipation of a future recovery of the primary market.
Finally, the consideration of the role of public debt and endogenous default costs in the
presence of financial frictions connects our paper to models with incomplete markets in the
tradition of Aiyagari (1994). Woodford (1990), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Aiyagari and
McGrattan (1998) show how public debt can help to relax financial constraints. Angeletos,
Collard, Dellas, and Diba (2013) explore the implications for optimal fiscal policy under com-
mitment. Given our no-commitment approach, we uncover the strategic manipulation of bond
prices and the option to default as additional motives facing policy-makers. Brutti (2011) and
Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014) study sovereign default in three-period economies where
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sovereign default destroys firms’ ability to insure against idiosyncratic shocks or the balance
sheets of domestic banks, respectively. They find that financial frictions can render sizeable
government debt positions sustainable even in the absence of reputational costs of default. Our
paper re-examines these findings in a fully dynamic environment which allows to analyze the
determination of long-run debt and shows that reputational fixed costs of default are critical to
render ergodic debt positions sustainable under fractional default. Notably, this result obtains
despite the essential role of public debt for production in our model.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 1 we lay out our model economy. In
Section 2 we examine Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policy while maintaining the assumption
of commitment to full debt repayment. In Section 3 we introduce the option of fractional
default. In Section 4 we study the quantitative implications of optimal fiscal policies in a
calibrated economy. In Section 5 we analyze the robustness of these implications to variations
in the degree of the endogenous and reputational costs of default, while Section 6 examines the
implications of aggregate uncertainty. In Section 7 we conclude.
1 The Environment
The economy is populated by households, firms and a government. There is a single non-
storable output good, which is either consumed by households or transformed at a unitary rate
into a public good by the government. The government can commit to fully repay outstanding
debt, but it lacks inter-temporal commitment to its choices for the income tax rate, public
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spending and debt issuances.5
Households. There is a continuum of measure one of identical, infinitely-lived households.
The preferences of a representative household j ∈ [0, 1] are given by
∞∑
t=0
βtu(cjt , 1− njt , gt), (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a time discount factor, cjt and njt denote consumption and labour effort of
household j, and gt denotes the level of public good provision. The period utility function u(·) is
assumed to be additively separable in its three arguments and twice continuously differentiable,
with partial derivatives uc > 0, ucc < 0, ul > 0, ull ≤ 0, ug > 0 and ugg ≤ 0.
Each household is composed of three types of members: workers, bankers and entrepreneurs.6
Workers supply labour to competitive firms; the other agents either become bankers or get
access to an entrepreneurial investment technology. The assignment to these two activities is
stochastic; an individual agent becomes banker with probability 1 − θ and entrepreneur with
probability θ, respectively. Household j enters period t with a stock of bjt government bonds.
Initially, all bonds are held by bankers and entrepreneurs, each of them holding the same
amount bjt . Then, the household members separate and individuals learn their type (banker or
entrepreneur) before the government’s policy decisions are announced.
Workers and firms. Workers supply their labour services nt, taking the wage rate wt as
given. Firms are perfectly competitive and have access to a production technology that trans-
5The assumption of comittment to full debt repayment will be relaxed in Section 3. Section 6 will introduce
aggregate uncertainty.
6Each household comprises a continuum [0, 1] of workers and a continuum [0, 1] of agents who become either
bankers or entrepreneurs.
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forms labour into consumption goods at a unitary rate. Specifically, the technology allows the
representative firm to produce
y1t = n˜t, (2)
where n˜t denotes labour hired by the firm. Production is subject to a moral hazard problem
which, in the absence of monitoring, makes it impossible for firms to pledge funds to workers
and outside creditors. Firms must therefore finance their wage bill in advance, and they can
do so using intra-period loans from financial intermediaries (bankers).
Bankers. Bankers act as delegated monitors. In order to meet firms’ demand for working
capital, they issue deposits contracts, dt, to outside creditors. However, although banks have
a greater capacity to pledge funds to outside creditors, they are also subject to moral hazard.
They can therefore only issue deposits if they are able to post collateral to cover at least a
fraction ξc ∈ (0, 1) of the amount issued.7 Government bonds are the sole source of collateral
available to bankers, such that the collateral constraint facing a representative banker from
household j is given by
djt ≤
bjt
ξc
, (3)
where djt denotes the deposits issued. Note that the banking sector is competitive, and hence
working capital loans do not carry a positive interest rate unless the supply of loans is depressed
by the bankers’ availability of collateral. Aggregating across firms and bankers, equilibrium in
7We assume an environment of impersonal market interactions so that household members cannot avoid
financial frictions internally; outside creditors are thus best thought of as workers from households other than
the banker’s own (cf. Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
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the bank-intermediated market for working capital loans implies that the economy’s aggregate
wage bill is constrained by8
wtn˜t ≤ (1− θ)bt
ξc
. (4)
Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs have access to a profitable investment technology. Specifically,
they can invest in projects that deliver a gross return R > 1 per unit of investment (both in
consumption goods). Denoting by Xjt the investment scale of the representative entrepreneur
from household j, the investment technology is characterised by
yj,2t = RX
j
t . (5)
Similar to the operation of banks, there is a moral hazard problem that limits entrepreneurs’
access to external finance. As a consequence, internal investment, xjt , is necessary to attract
external funds, ejt . External funds take the form of intra-period loans from workers and bankers
that pay zero interest as there is no discounting within the period. To raise the consumption
goods required for internal investment, entrepreneurs sell their liquid assets (government bonds)
on the secondary market; hence, xjt = ztb
j
t , where zt denotes the bond’s market price.
9 They
8Notice from (4) that ξc can be interpreted as a compound parameter reflecting both the collateral constraint
facing bankers and the working capital constraint facing firms. In particular, (4) can be rewritten as ξwwtn˜t ≤
(1 − θ)bt/ξd with ξc = ξwξd. This highlights that our model is observationally equivalent to an alternative
specification where firms need to finance in advance only a fraction ξw of their wage bill.
9We assume that the secondary market for government debt is large enough to absorb the supply of bonds
from entrepreneurs. Formally, wtnt + (1−wt)n˜t ≥ θztbt, where variables without superscript denote economy-
wide aggregates. This condition is satisfied in all our numerical experiments.
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then augment their internal funds by acquiring external funds subject to the constraint
ejt ≤
xjt
ξl
, (6)
where ξl ∈ (0, 1). Constraint (6) is always binding when R > 1, resulting in an investment
scale of Xjt = (1 + ξ
l)/(ξl)ztb
j
t per entrepreneur.
Aggregation. After production in the competitive and entrepreneurial sector has taken place,
workers, bankers and entrepreneurs transfer their earnings back to the household. Consumption-
savings decisions are then made at the household level; hence there is perfect consumption in-
surance within households. Aggregating over household members, the total income of household
j in period t is the sum of the wage income earned by workers, profits in the competitive sector
(given free entry of firms, these profits arise whenever collateral is scarce and then completely
accrue to the bankers), and entrepreneurs’ net return from investment,
Ijt = wtn
j
t + (1− wt)n˜jt + θ(R− 1)
1 + ξl
ξl
ztb
j
t . (7)
Note that (7) does not include income from maturing government debt bjt . The household’s
budget constraint is given by
cjt + qtb
j
t+1 ≤ (1− τt)Ijt + bjt , (8)
where τt is a proportional income tax and qt denotes the price of a newly issued government
bond that promises one unit of wealth in the beginning of t+ 1.
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The government. The government is benevolent and maximises the utility (1) of the repre-
sentative household. Its policy tools are the income tax τt, the level of public good provision
gt, and the issuance of new debt Bt+1. The government’s budget constraint is given by
gt +Bt ≤ τtIt + qtBt+1. (9)
The government cannot commit to a fixed policy path over time. It can, however, make
credible policy announcements within a given time period. This timing structure implies that
the government is a Stackelberg leader vis-a`-vis the private sector. Table 1 summarises the
timing of events in any given period t.
Table 1: Timing of Events in Period t
1. The household endows each of its bankers and entrepreneurs with bt government bonds.
2. The household members separate and individual types (banker or entrepreneur) are
realised.
3. The government announces its policies (τt, gt, Bt+1).
4. Bankers issue deposits, dt, subject to collateral constraint (3) and make working capital
loans to firms. Firms hire labour, n˜t, subject to constraint (4). They produce y
1
t = n˜t
consumption goods.
5. Entrepreneurs sell their government bonds to raise internal funds, xt, and raise external
funds, et, from workers and bankers subject to external finance constraint (6). They
invest into projects of scale Xt = xt + et, which return y
2
t = RXt consumption goods.
6. The government collects income taxes, τtIt, transforms gt units of the consumption good
into a public good, repays the maturing debt Bt and issues new debt Bt+1 at price qt.
Households consume ct and purchase newly issued government debt, bt+1.
2 Markov-perfect Optimal Fiscal Policy without Default
Under lack of commitment, the government in a given time period can choose policy variables
for that period but it cannot control policy variables for the future. To characterise the optimal
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policies we adopt a primal approach. Accordingly, the incumbent government directly chooses
consumption c, labour n, and debt issuance b′ for the current period, taking as given the policy
rules {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ} employed by future governments, and subject to the requirement that its choices
are consistent with a private-sector equilibrium.
Private-sector equilibrium. Households in our model are atomistic and take prices (wt, zt, qt)
∞
t=0
and policies (τt, gt, Bt+1)
∞
t=0 as given. They choose consumption, labour supply, labour demand,
and savings to maximise their objective function (1). Since there is no discounting within the
time period, the secondary market price of a government bond must equal its repayment rate,
that is, zt = 1 in all periods. Adopting recursive notation and dropping the superscript j, the
optimization problem faced by the representative household reads
V˜ (b;w, q, τ, g) = max
c,n,n˜,b′
min
λ,µ
u(c, 1− n, g) + βV˜ (b′;w′, q′, τ ′, g′)
−λ
(
c+ qb′ − (1− τ)
{
wn+ (1− w)n˜+ θ(R− 1)1 + ξ
l
ξl
b
}
− b
)
−µ
(
wn˜− (1− θ)b
ξc
)
.
From the first-order conditions associated with this problem, it is straightforward to show that
the households’ policies in a private-sector equilibrium satisfy the Euler equation
q = β
u′c
uc
(1 + pi′ + φ′) (10)
and the budget constraint
ucc+ βu
′
c(1 + pi
′ + φ′)b′ =
ul
w
n+ uc(1 + pi)b, (11)
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where
pi = θ(1− τ)(R− 1)1 + ξ
l
ξl
, (12)
φ = (1− θ)(1− τ)(1− w)
wξc
, (13)
denote the liquidity and the collateral premia on government bonds, respectively. The Euler
equation (10) thus highlights the three roles played by government bonds in our model: (i) they
allow households to shift consumption over time; (ii) they provide liquidity and hence allow
households to increase entrepreneurial investment; and (iii) they are a source of collateral to
bankers.
The optimal fiscal policy problem. Inspection of the private-sector equilibrium conditions
shows that the aggregate state vector in our model consists of only one variable, b. The policy
rules {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ} are thus of the form c = cˆ(b), n = nˆ(b), and b′ = bˆ(b). Via households’ optimal
consumption-leisure choice and equations (12) and (13) these rules further imply decision rules
for the tax rate, τˆ(b), the liquidity premium, pˆi(b), and the collateral premium, φˆ(b), respectively.
Plugging these functions into Euler equation (10), we can write the bond pricing function as
Q(uc, b
′) = β
uc(cˆ(b
′))
uc
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
. (14)
As households have a finite intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the bond price depends
on the current and future marginal utility of consumption. This entails an interest rate ma-
nipulation motive for the government, which seeks to sustain bond prices via a debt policy
that induces expectations of increased future marginal utility as well as liquidity and collateral
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premia. Note also that the wage rate falls below labour productivity if firms’ access to working
capital loans is strictly constrained by the bankers’ pledgeable collateral (cf. equation (13)).
This allows us to write the wage rate as a function
ω(b, n) =

1 if (1− θ)b > ξcn
(1−θ)b
ξcn
otherwise.
(15)
Using the aggregate resource constraint to substitute for public consumption in the household
utility function (1), and the private-sector optimality condition (ul)/(uc) = (1 − τ)w to elim-
inate taxes from (12) and (13), the discretionary government’s optimization problem under
commitment to full debt repayment is given by
V (b) = max
c,n,b′
min
γ
u(c, 1− n, n+ rb− c) + βV (b′) (16)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ(uc, b
′)b′ − ul
ω(b, n)
n− uc{1 + pi(b, c, n)}b
)
,
where r = θ(R−1)1+ξl
ξl
denotes the net return to entrepreneurial investment, γ is a non-negative
Lagrangian multiplier and V (b′) is the continuation value function.
Definition 1. A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a set of policy functions P = {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ}, a value
function V and a bond pricing function Q such that:
(i) given the value function V and the bond pricing function Q, the policy functions {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ}
solve the government’s optimization problem (16);
(ii) given the policy functions {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ}, the bond pricing function Q satisfies (14);
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(iii) given the policy functions {cˆ, nˆ, bˆ}, the value function satisfies the Bellman equation
V (b) = u(cˆ(b), 1− nˆ(b), nˆ(b) + rb− cˆ(b)) + βV (bˆ(b)).
The following proposition characterises the optimal debt policy in a Markov-perfect equilib-
rium.10
Proposition 1. In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the optimal debt policy satisfies the generalised
Euler equation
γ′
(
u′c(1 + pi
′)− u
′
l
ω(b′, n′)2
ω1(b
′, n′){n′ + rb′}
)
− u′gr = γu′c(1 + pi′ + φ′) (1 + εqb′) , (17)
where εqb′ =
Q2(uc,b′)b′
Q(uc,b′) denotes the elasticity of the bond price q with respect to changes in debt
issuance b′.
The generalised Euler equation equates the marginal cost of entering the next period with a
higher stock of outstanding debt to the marginal benefit of relaxing implementability constraint
(11) via issuing additional debt. Whenever government bonds provide liquidity and collateral
services, (17) dictates convergence to a positive level of long-run debt.11 The role of government
debt in mitigating financial frictions also suggests that the accumulation of moderate levels of
debt may have positive welfare effects.
10We assume differentiability of policy and value functions, mainly to build intuition based on the government’s
generalised Euler equation. From equation (15), it is clear that there emerges a local non-differentiability at
the point where the collateral constraint (4) becomes non-binding. Apart from this point, first-order conditions
remain useful to characterise optimal government policy.
11The Web Appendix establishes this formally and provides some discussion of the government’s interest rate
manipulation motive encapsulated in condition (17).
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Proposition 2. The accumulation of moderate levels of debt has positive welfare effects if
government bonds serve as collateral, ξc > 0, or provide liquidity, ξl > 0, with a sufficiently
high return to investment in the entrepreneurial sector,
r >
uc
ul
(
1− ul
ug
ul
ug
− ull
ul
n
)
. (18)
Without financial frictions, i.e., if ξc = 0 and r = 0, welfare is monotonically decreasing in
debt.
For the government’s value function to be increasing in debt, the marginal benefit from re-
laxing the collateral constraint and from increased liquidity must exceed the marginal cost
from increased taxation. The marginal benefit is generically (weakly) decreasing in the level
of debt, while the marginal cost due to increased tax distortions is strictly increasing in debt.
Accordingly, the value function in our model has an inverted U-shape.
Tightly linked to the shape of the value function is the emergence of a debt Laffer curve, i.e.,
a situation where – locally – a marginal increase in the quantity of debt issued is associated
with a reduction in the revenue for the government from that operation. When this happens,
we say the economy is on the ‘bad’ side of the debt Laffer curve.
Proposition 3. The optimal debt policy is subject to a Laffer curve: When marginal debt has
positive (negative) welfare effects, the economy is on the ‘bad’ (‘good’) side of the debt Laffer
curve.
Since the issuance of debt helps to relax financial frictions, an extra unit of debt tends to reduce
collateral and liquidity premia and hence the price for all inframarginal units of debt. A debt
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Laffer curve emerges whenever bond prices fall strongly in the amount of debt issued, i.e., when
εqb′ < −1. But this happens precisely when debt is scarce – and therefore valuable – so that
collateral and liquidity premia are both relevant and highly sensitive to the amount of debt.12
It is thus precisely the beneficial effect of the government’s debt policy via the relaxation of
financial constraints that induces a Laffer curve.
3 Markov-perfect Optimal Fiscal Policy with Default
We now introduce the option of fractional default, i.e., the government can decide in a dis-
cretionary manner on the fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1] of outstanding debt it repays. At the same time,
and in line with the sovereign default literature, we introduce reputational costs of default.
Following a default, the government is temporarily excluded from the primary bond market,
and outstanding bonds can no longer be traded on the secondary market. Since entrepreneurs’
access to external funds crucially relies on their ability to sell their bonds on the secondary
market, government default thus precludes entrepreneurial production. The duration of the
market exclusion is stochastic; with a constant probability α an excluded government can re-
access the bond market in the next period. However, we assume that during the bond market
exclusion the government can still issue debt in the form of loans. Loans serve as collateral
but are not tradeable on secondary markets and hence not a source of liquidity.13 The loss in
12The debt Laffer curve facing the government thus has a U-shape (not the inverted U-shape familiar from
other contexts); compare Figure 3 below.
13Consistent with this assumption is the empirical evidence presented in Bai, Julliard, and Yuan (2012).
These authors analyze Eurozone sovereign bond markets in the period 2006-2012 and find that secondary market
liquidity has been significantly reduced during the recent crisis, with markets basically drying up in countries
that received a bailout (Greece and Portugal). Their data is compiled from both international and domestic
interdealer markets and therefore a good indicator for the secondary market trading volume at both levels, and
in particular for the loss in liquidity relevant to domestic agents. Relatedly, Arellano, Mateos-Planas, and Rios-
Rull (2013) document that countries continue to borrow when they are in arrears. The complete exclusion also
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liquidity raises the government’s borrowing cost during a default episode. Finally, note that
the costs via reduced collateral depend on the size of the implemented haircut, whereas the
repercussions of market exclusion are of a fixed-cost nature.
The optimal fiscal policy problem under fractional default. It is convenient to cast
the incumbent government’s optimal policy problem under the option to default as a two-stage
decision problem. The government first decides whether or not to repay the entirety of its
outstanding debt. Conditional on this decision, the government then chooses its relevant policy
instruments. Define V o(b) as the value function for a government that has the option to default
and starts the current period with b outstanding bonds. This value function satisfies
V o(b) = max{V nd(b), V d(b)}, (19)
where V nd(b) is the value conditional on full repayment (ρ = 1) and V d(b) is the value condi-
tional on default (ρ < 1). The no-default value function is the solution to
V nd(b) = max
c,n,b′
min
γ
u(c, 1− n, n+ rb− c) + βV o(b′) (20)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
b(uc, b
′)b′ − ul
ω(b, n)
n− uc{1 + pi(b, c, n)}b
)
,
where ω(b, n) and Qb(uc, b
′) are the pricing functions for labour and newly issued bonds, re-
from the primary market for debt considered in the literature (cf. Arellano, 2008) thus has the counterfactual
implication of zero outstanding debt following a default. Introducing a primary market for loans is one way to
address this concern.
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spectively. The government’s value function under default is given by
V d(b) = max
ρ∈[0,1]
V˜ d(ρb), (21)
where
V˜ d(ρb) = max
c,n,`′
min
γ
u(c, 1− n, n− c) + βW o(`′) + γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
`(uc, `
′)`′ − ul
ω(ρb, n)
n− ucρb
)
is the value function conditional on a given repayment rate ρ < 1, and `′ and Q`(uc, `′) denote
newly issued loans and the underlying pricing function, respectively. This formulation makes
clear that what ultimately matters for allocations and welfare is the effective state ρb. Since this
state can be regulated via the repayment policy ρ ∈ [0, 1], the default value function V d(b) is
necessarily non-decreasing over the entire state space. Specifically, V d(b) is increasing whenever
the optimal policy prescribes full debt repayment, and constant whenever it prescribes partial
default. Finally, W o(`) is the value function of a government that starts the period with `
outstanding loans,
W o(`) = αmax{W nda (`),W d(`)}+ (1− α) max{W nde (`),W d(`)}, (22)
where W nda (`) is the value function conditional on full repayment of a government that regains
access to the bond market in the beginning of the period, W nde (`) is the no-default value function
of a government that remains excluded from the bond market, and W d(`) is the value function
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conditional on default. These value functions satisfy14
W nda (`) = max
c,n,b′
min
γ
u(c, 1− n, n− c) + βV o(b′) (23)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
b(uc, b
′)b′ − ul
ω(`, n)
n− uc`
)
,
W nde (`) = max
c,n,`′
min
γ
u(c, 1− n, n− c) + βW o(`′) (24)
+γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
`(uc, `
′)`′ − ul
ω(`, n)
n− uc`
)
,
W d(`) = max
ρ∈[0,1]
W˜ d(ρ`), (25)
where W˜ d(ρ`) denotes the value function conditional on a given repayment rate ρ on loans,
W˜ d(ρ`) = max
c,n,`′
min
γ
u(c, 1− n, n− c) + βW o(`′) + γ
(
ucc+ ucQ
`(uc, `
′)`′ − ul
ω(ρ`, n)
n− ucρ`
)
.
The following proposition characterises the optimal default policy when the government has
access to the bond market.
Proposition 4. The government’s optimal default policy is of a fiscal limit type, i.e., the
government optimally defaults if and only if its inherited stock of bonds exceeds a threshold level
b¯. The optimal repayment policy takes the form
ρˆ(b) =

1 if b ≤ b¯
b/b if b > b¯
14It is not necessary to index W d(`) by a or e, since default precludes the current government’s option
of immediate bond market access. Moreover, because default hampers the liquidity of maturing bonds, the
value of defaulting is independent of whether outstanding liabilities are in the form of bonds or loans, that
is, V d(x) = W d(x) and V˜ d(x) = W˜ d(x), where x denotes the (effective) amount of outstanding liabilities.
Finally, note also that Wnde (`) = W˜
d(ρ`) for ρ = 1. Accordingly, Wnde (`) = W
d(`) whenever the optimal policy
prescribes full debt repayment.
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where b is the lowest level of (effective) debt that maximises post-default welfare, b = arg maxb V˜
d(b).
At b the collateral constraint is strictly binding.
Equivalent results apply also for the case where the government is excluded from the bond
market and outstanding debt is in the form of loans.15 The intuition behind Proposition 4 is
readily seen (compare also Figure 2 below). The value function conditional on default, V d(b), is
non-decreasing over the entire state space and constant whenever the optimal policy prescribes
ρ < 1. Denote this constant level of welfare by V¯ d. The value function conditional on full
repayment, V nd(b), has an inverted U-shape. Hence there exists a unique default threshold
b¯, implicitly defined via V nd(b¯) = V¯ d.16 For higher levels of debt, b > b¯, the optimal haircut
reduces effective debt to the lowest level that maximises post-default welfare. This post-default
level of effective debt b necessarily induces a strictly binding collateral constraint. Intuitively,
this is because default destroys the liquidity value of maturing debt. The optimal default
policy, which trades off the marginal benefits from reduced taxation with the marginal costs
from reduced collateral, therefore has to reduce the available collateral below its satiation level.
A government exercising its default option will thus find it optimal to make the post-default
level of debt so scarce that financial intermediation is hampered.
It is interesting to contrast the optimal repayment policy characterised in Proposition 4 with
the endogenous debt recovery function arising in Yue’s (2010) model of debt renegotiation. In
both models a default episode results in a unique level b of post-default debt, which implies that
the repayment rate of defaulted debt decreases with the pre-default level of debt. However, Yue
15The optimal default policy for loans is formally characterised in the Web Appendix, which also provides a
formal definition of the Markov-perfect equilibrium under the option to default.
16Along its upward-sloping segment the no-default value function V nd strictly dominates the default value
function V d. Default reduces the (valuable) amount of effective debt and additionally subjects the economy to
the costs from the secondary market collapse. Default can thus not be optimal.
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(2010) studies an endowment economy with exogenous default costs where default is initially
complete, but subsequent debt renegotiation results in an endogeous recovery rate; new net
lending becomes available once the renegotiated debt is fully repaid. By contrast, in our model
default is partial in the first place and disciplined via the endogenous costs for production
from lost collateral and liquidity; the duration of secondary market exclusion is stochastic, but
borrowing on the primary market remains possible.
Based on Proposition 4 we can formally examine the sustainability of optimal fiscal policy
in the face of strategic default incentives.
Definition 2. Given a state space B and a region B˜ ⊂ B, a Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policy
P is sustainable over B˜ if
(i) the incumbent government finds it optimal to employ the policy P and to fully honor
inherited debt for all b ∈ B˜ when it perceives that all future governments will employ the
policy P and fully honor inherited debt in B˜; and
(ii) the debt policy bˆ ∈ P is ergodic, i.e., it satisfies bˆ(b) ∈ B˜ for all b ∈ B˜.
Two comments are in order. First, if the steady state debt level under commitment to full
repayment lies in a sustainable region B˜, then the Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policy under
the option to default coincides with the Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policy under commitment
to full repayment over this region. Second, under our concept of sustainability, default does
not occur in equilibrium if the initial level of debt is in a sustainable region. For the case when
there are no reputational default costs, we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 5. Absent reputational costs of default, no Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policy is
sustainable over regions on the ‘good’ side of the debt Laffer curve.
To understand the underlying intuition, notice that the value function V nd(b) inherits the
properties discussed in Proposition 3: It is increasing in debt on the ‘bad’ side of the Laffer
curve and decreasing on the ‘good’ side. Denote by V¯ the maximum of V nd(b) and by b∗∗ the
level of debt at which the maximum is attained, i.e., V nd(b∗∗) = V¯ . It is then straightforward to
see that the default value function in the absence of reputational costs satisfies V d(b) = V nd(b)
for all b ≤ b∗∗ and V d(b) = V¯ for all b > b∗∗. Hence the government defaults for all debt levels
on the ‘good’ side of the Laffer curve. Reputational costs of default are therefore critically
needed to support debt positions that are consistent with conventional pricing of public debt
(εqb′ > −1). Notice also that this result is obtained despite our assumptions which assign an
important role to public debt as a source of collateral and private liquidity.
4 A Calibrated Economy
We now examine the key quantitative properties of Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policies in a
calibrated economy. We consider an instantaneous utility function u that is additively separable
and allows for curvature in all its arguments,
u(c, 1− n, g) = (1− ωg)
(
ωc
c1−σc − 1
1− σc + (1− ωc)
(1− n)1−σl − 1
1− σl
)
+ ωg
g1−σg − 1
1− σg , (26)
where ωc and ωg denote preference weights on private and public consumption, and σc, σl and
σg are (inverse) elasticities. We target data at annual frequency and select parameter values as
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follows. The three elasticities σc, σl and σg are each set to the value 2, which is in the middle
of the parameter range typically considered in the macroeconomic literature. The preference
weights are chosen such that, in the model’s steady state, g∗/c∗ = 0.25 and n∗ = 0.3; the
resulting values are ωc = 0.15 and ωg = 0.015.
17
Our choice of the parameters regulating the importance of financial frictions is meant to be
suggestive. In Section 5 below we will examine the robustness of our quantitative findings to
alternative parameterizations. The collateral parameter is set to ξc = 0.4, corresponding to a
debt-to-equity ratio of 2.5; this matches the relevant statistic for financial corporations in the
U.S. in 2012 (OECD, 2014).18 The parameters R, θ and ξl matter jointly, as determinants of the
return to entrepreneurial investment, r = θ(R−1)(1+ξl)/(ξl). The individual parameter values
are selected in line with evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). As discussed in
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), the SCF reports a median of the distribution of capital
gains in private business investment of roughly 7%. This motivates our choice of r = 0.07. We
set θ = 0.25 as a compromise between the population share (8%) of entrepreneurs and the
fraction of wealth (33%) controlled by them (cf. Covas and Fujita, 2011). For simplicity, we set
ξl = ξc, implying R = 1 + (rξl)/(θ{1 + ξl}) = 1.08. We choose the discount factor β = 0.92 to
17Given the utility specification in (26), our model nests the economy of Debortoli and Nunes (2013) as
a special case, which allows us to assess the effects of collateral, liquidity and default against a well-defined
benchmark. Notice therefore that our parameterization for σg implies that government expenditure is relatively
unresponsive to changes in debt and would result in a positive steady state level of debt also in Debortoli
and Nunes (2013). The Web Appendix provides some robustness analysis regarding the steady state effects of
variations in σg.
18Financial corporations are all private and public entities engaged in financial activities, such as monetary
institutions, financial intermediaries, insurance companies and pension funds. We work with this broad concept
of financial intermediation – as opposed to a narrow concept based only on banks – in order to capture the
importance of government debt for the operation also of non-bank financial corporations. Looking at the
banking sector only would imply a leverage ratio of 5.2 (ξc ≈ 0.19). The statistics for the U.K. in 2012 are a
debt-to-equity ratio for financial corporations of 8 and a leverage ratio in the banking industry of 12; this would
correspond to a collateral parameter of ξc ≈ 0.13 or ξc ≈ 0.08, respectively. See Table 4 below for key outcomes
under the alternative values ξc = 0.2 and ξc = 0.1.
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match an annual risk-free real interest rate of about 3% in the presence of a steady state with
a satiated demand for collateral but a positive liquidity premium.19 Finally, we set α = 0.5
which implies that, on average, the bond market is impaired during the default period and
the two following periods. This duration of two years is consistent with the empirical evidence
reported by Bai, Julliard, and Yuan (2012), and it is also broadly in line with estimates and
calibrations reported in the sovereign debt literature (cf. Cruces and Trebesch, 2013; Arellano,
2008; Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza, 2010). Our parameter choices are summarised in Table 2.
For given parameters, we solve the model numerically using dynamic programming techniques.20
Table 2: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
σc 2 elasticity of private consumption
σg 2 elasticity of public consumption
σl 2 elasticity of leisure
ωc 0.15 weight of consumption (priv.+publ.) vs. leisure
ωg 0.015 weight of public vs. private consumption
ξc 0.4 inverse of bank debt-to-equity ratio
r 0.07 return to entrepreneurial investment
θ 0.25 share of entrepreneurs
ξl 0.4 inverse of entrepreneurial debt-to-equity ratio
R 1.08 entrepreneurial investment technology
β 0.92 discount factor
α 0.5 market reaccess probability
Steady state. The steady state values of key endogenous variables are presented in Table 3. In
line with our calibration target, steady state output in the competitive sector is roughly equal
to y1
∗
= 0.3. Value added in the entrepreneurial sector is significantly smaller, y2
∗
= 0.019,
such that total output is given by y∗ = 0.3220. Private and public consumption amount to 80%
19The bond pricing function (14), evaluated at steady state, then implies q∗ = β(1 + pi∗) = β(1 + (1− τ∗)r).
20The Web Appendix provides further details on our computational algorithm.
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and 20% of total output, respectively (c∗ = 0.2578, g∗ = 0.0642). The steady state level of debt
is positive and sizeable, b∗ = 0.2712, which corresponds to a debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 84%.
Steady state debt is fully honored, ρ = 1. The bond price q∗ = 0.97 implies an annual interest
rate close to our calibration target of 3% and the tax rate is empirically plausible, τ ∗ = 22.5%.
The wage rate is equal to labour productivity, w∗ = 1, i.e., there is endogenous accumulation
of debt beyond the satiation point for collateral demand.
Table 3: Steady State Values
Variable Steady state
y1 0.3030
y2 0.0190
y 0.3220
c 0.2578
g 0.0642
b 0.2712
b/y 0.8422
q 0.9699
τ 0.2248
w 1.0000
ρ 1.0000
Policy functions. The optimal policy functions are displayed in Figure 1.21 These functions
display kinks in the region of the state space where the collateral constraint kicks in as well as
discontinuities at the fiscal limit. Note that the state space B = [bmin, bmax] can be partitioned
into four regions that differ significantly in how optimal policies react to variations in the
inherited debt level. In the first region, B1 = [bmin, b1), debt is so scarce that the collateral
constraint is strictly binding. In the second region, B2 = [b1, b2), the collateral constraint
is non-binding under optimal policies, but its existence nevertheless affects the government’s
21We restrict attention to the case when outstanding debt is in the form of bonds. Plots of the policy functions
for the case when outstanding debt is in the form of loans are available in the Web Appendix.
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optimal policy trade-offs. In the third region, B3 = [b2, b3], the collateral constraint has no
distortionary effects on optimal policies. Finally, whereas the government fully repays debt
in regions B1, B2 and B3, it fractionally defaults in region B4 = (b3, bmax]. In our calibrated
economy, b1 = 0.1745, b2 = 0.1800 and b3 = 0.2975, which corresponds to approximately 54%,
56% and 92% of steady state output, respectively. At the fiscal limit b3, the haircut on debt
amounts to about 40%.
Welfare. Figure 2 shows the value functions of the government under the option to default.
The top panel contrasts the government’s value function conditional on no default (V nd(b))
and on default (V d(b)) when bond markets are fully operational. Under full repayment, the
government’s value function has an inverted U-shape. Under partial default, it is monotonically
increasing for low levels of debt and constant from b = 0.1705 onwards. The two value functions
intersect at the fiscal limit b¯ = b3 = 0.2975, which corresponds to about 92% of steady state
output.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 contrasts the government’s value functions when outstanding
debt is in the form of loans, as formalised in equation (22). The no-default value functions
W nda (`) and W
nd
e (`) have an inverted U-shape. The value function conditional on default
actually coincides with its counterpart when maturing debt is in the form of bonds, W d(`) =
V d(b) for ` = b; this is because default hampers the liquidity of maturing bonds. In analogy to
the case of fully operational bond markets, there thus emerge two further default thresholds for
maturing loans. Conditional on regaining market access, the government fully honors its debt
up to the point where W nda (`) and W
d(`) intersect, which corresponds to ¯`a = 0.2630 in our
calibrated economy. On the other hand, W nde (`) ≤ W d(`) globally, and the inequality becomes
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(a) Repayment rate (b) Wage rate
(c) Consumption (d) Public spending
(e) Labour (f) Tax rate
(g) Price of new debt (h) Debt issuance
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strict when ` > b; when excluded from the bond market, the government thus fully honors its
maturing loans up to this threshold, ¯`e = b = 0.1705.
The debt Laffer curve. Inspection of the debt policy function bˆ displayed in Figure 1 shows
that, independent of the initial debt stock, the government always issues an amount of debt
that is sufficient to ensure a non-binding collateral constraint in the future. To understand the
intuition behind this finding, first note that, as prescribed by Proposition 2, the social welfare
function has an inverted U-shape. Specifically, the welfare function is initially upward-sloping
in region B1, where the collateral constraint is strictly binding, and later downward-sloping.
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Given this shape, for every relevant choice b′ ∈ B1 there hence exists an alternative choice
b˜′ > b′ such that V nd(b˜′) = V nd(b′). Since b′ and b˜′ deliver the same continuation payoff to the
government, a necessary condition for b′ to be optimal is to generate a higher current revenue
from debt creation compared to b˜′. Formally, given the optimal choice of current consumption,
c = cˆ(b), the debt issuance b′ can be an optimal choice only if Q(uc, b′)b′ > Q(uc, b˜′)b˜′. Figure 3
Figure 3: Welfare and the Debt Laffer Curve
(a) Value function (b) Revenue from debt issuance
shows that this is not the case in our calibrated economy. In particular, the figure shows that
debt choices b′ ∈ B1 generate a lower current revenue than the corresponding choices b˜′ ∈ B3.22
This pattern reflects the debt Laffer curve discussed in Proposition 3. Facing declining bond
prices associated with suboptimal, low choices of b′ ∈ B1, the government responds by an
aggressive debt policy in order to escape the Laffer curve region. An important corollary to
this observation is that, at least in the context of our quantitative results, the no-sustainability
result of Proposition 5 can be further generalised. Specifically, regions on the ‘bad’ side of
the debt Laffer curve are not ergodic so that Markov-perfect optimal fiscal policy fails to be
22As an example, consider an inherited level of debt b = 0.1 and the two alternative debt choices b′ = 0.15
and b˜′ = 0.22. These two choices deliver the exact same continuation welfare level V nd(0.15) = V nd(0.22) =
−12.5685. Yet, the current revenue from issuing b˜′ = 0.22 exceeds the current revenue from issuing b′ = 0.15
for all possible values of c, including the optimal one at c ≈ 0.23.
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sustainable also here.
5 Default Costs and Debt Sustainability
The interaction of both reputational (fixed) and contemporaneous (variable) default costs is
critical for our model to jointly generate empirically plausible statistics for steady state debt,
the default threshold and the haircut imposed at this threshold. In order to further highlight
this point, but also to examine the robustness of our quantitative results to alternative parame-
terizations, we now examine the contribution of each default cost channel to the determination
of long-run debt and its sustainability.
Liquidity. The liquidity role of government debt is essential to generate a steady state with
government liabilities in excess of the level satiating the economy’s collateral constraint. To see
this, note that our calibration, particularly that of ξc, implies a demand for collateral in the
order of 50% of output. For higher levels of debt, the economy’s collateral constraint is slack,
which leaves the government facing a trade-off between the liquidity services of increased debt
and the associated tax distortions. Figure 4 depicts the value functions V nd(b) and V d(b) for
the case where public debt is not needed as a source of liquidity (R = 1).23 The steady state
emerges at b∗ = 0.1475, and the fiscal limit at b¯ = 0.1740, which coincides with the level of debt
that just satiates the economy’s demand for collateral. Both points are located at significantly
lower debt-to-GDP ratios than their counterparts from our benchmark calibration. Another
important takeaway from Figure 4 is that the steady state is located in the upward-sloping
23Notice that this scenario makes bonds and loans equivalent so that there are no costs from a secondary
market freeze.
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segment of V nd(b) and therefore sustainable. The reason behind this is that the collateral
constraint is strictly binding at b∗. Clearly, debt positions b > b¯ are not sustainable and cannot
constitute a steady state. However, also at b¯, where the collateral premium on government
debt just vanishes, the government’s interest manipulation motive induces a decumulation of
debt.24 In the complete absence of a liquidity role, the model rationalises debt convergence to
only moderate levels. The first three columns of Table 4 consider the effects of variations in the
importance of liquidity demand around the benchmark R = 1.08. The findings are as expected:
An increase in R increases overall output as well as the share of entrepreneurial production
in it, pushes both steady state debt and the fiscal limit to a higher level, but decreases the
repayment rate at the fiscal limit. Quantitatively, however, these effects are relatively small,
and throughout the demand for collateral remains satiated at steady state.
Collateral. The collateral role of government debt is essential to generate empirically plausible
haircuts in the case of default. This property is illustrated in Figure 5, which plots the value
functions, along with the steady state and the fiscal limit, for the case where public debt plays
24Steady states with a strictly binding collateral constraint are obtained also under parameterizations in the
neighborhood of R = 1. Liquidity benefits must thus be sufficiently strong to induce debt accumulation to a
point where the demand for collateral is satiated.
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le Table 4: Steady State and Fiscal Limit under Varying Liquidity and Collateral RolesVariable R = 1.06 R = 1.08 R = 1.10 R = 1.08 R = 1.08 R = 1.08ξc = 0.4 ξc = 0.4 ξc = 0.4 ξc = 0.2 ξc = 0.1 ξc = 0y1 0.3057 0.3030 0.3003 0.3003 0.3003 0.3030
y2 0.0137 0.0190 0.0247 0.0190 0.0190 0.0190
y 0.3194 0.3220 0.3250 0.3220 0.3220 0.3220
b 0.2590 0.2712 0.2831 0.2712 0.2712 0.2712
b/y 0.8109 0.8422 0.8711 0.8422 0.8422 0.8422
b¯ 0.2682 0.2975 0.3223 0.2852 0.2808 0.2779
b¯/y 0.8397 0.9239 0.9917 0.8857 0.8720 0.8630
ρ(b¯) 0.6283 0.5731 0.5337 0.3156 0.1567 0
b 0.1685 0.1705 0.1720 0.0900 0.0440 0
no role as collateral (ξc = 0). Note that, absent a demand for collateral, the value function
Figure 5: Value Function without Collateral Role
under default V d(b) is flat such that, conditional on default occurring, the government imposes
a 100% haircut (ρ = 0). The absence of a collateral role actually leaves the steady state level
of debt unaffected at b∗ = 0.2712, and the same is true for the other steady state variables.
On the other hand, the collateral role has quantitatively relevant implications for the optimal
haircut and by consequence for the fiscal limit itself, which is now at b¯ = 0.2779. This reflects a
feedback effect: Conditional on defaulting, the government’s optimal policy in the absence of a
collateral role is to completely wipe out its liabilities; this implies a more advantageous default
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value function and thus a tighter fiscal limit. The fourth and fifth column of Table 4 assess the
effects of varying the collateral parameter between our baseline of ξc = 0.4 and the scenario
of ξc = 0 just discussed. As discussed above, the collateral constraint remains non-binding in
steady state for a wide set of parameterizations around our benchmark of R = 1.08. Under
a non-binding collateral constraint, in turn, the long-run level of debt is completely invariant
to ξc and instead determined via the trade-off between liquidity provision and tax distortions.
In consequence, all steady state outcomes remain unchanged, and also the quantitative effect
on the fiscal limit is minor. However, with the repayment rate ρ(b¯) falling from about 57% to
32%, 16% and ultimately 0%, the reduced demand for collateral has important effects on the
optimal haircut imposed. Throughout, the effective post-default level of debt b is tight enough
to induce a binding collateral constraint (cf. Proposition 4).
Market exclusion. For sufficiently high levels of debt the liquidity value of government bonds
is dominated by the associated tax distortions, resulting in a downward-sloping value function,
V ndb (b) < 0. However, since default via fractional repayment of maturing debt amounts to
rescaling the effective level of debt, any level of debt such that V ndb (b) < 0 is not sustainable,
unless there is some additional fixed cost of defaulting. The loss in liquidity due to the govern-
ment’s exclusion from the bond market is therefore critically needed in order to sustain sizeable
debt positions. Figure 6 illustrates how the three default thresholds {b¯, ¯`a, ¯`e} depend on the
market re-access probability α. We observe that debt-to-GDP ratios in the order of magnitude
of 100% are sustainable under quite moderate average exclusion durations. The default thresh-
olds b¯ and ¯`a are both monotonically decreasing in α. This reflects that a higher probability of
market re-access lowers the expected cost of the bond market exclusion triggered by default;
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accordingly, the maximum sustainable level of debt is reduced. Quantitatively, however, an
increase in α above our benchmark of α = 0.5 has only relatively minor consequences for the
fiscal limit: expressed as a fraction of steady state output, it changes from 92% for α = 0.5 to
89% for α = 0.9. Finally, the default threshold ¯`e is independent of α because the government
is already excluded from the bond market and thus incurs only the contemporaneous costs due
to the reduction in pledgeable collateral. At the threshold ¯`e these costs exactly balance the
benefits of default due to reduced tax distortions. As also the benefits are independent of the
re-access probability, so is the default threshold ¯`e.
Labour supply. The elasticity of labour supply has been identified as an important determi-
nant of endogenous default costs in the recent literature on external sovereign debt (Mendoza
and Yue, 2012).25 Table 5 examines the implications of variations in σl, the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply, on the determination of long-run debt and its sustainability.
As seen, the steady state levels of output and debt are monotonically decreasing in σl, and
so is the fiscal limit. However, when normalised by steady state output to remove the level
25The comparison with this literature is complicated as our specification of preferences does not eliminate
wealth effects on labour supply.
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le Table 5: Steady State and Fiscal Limit under Varying Labour Supply ElasticityVariable σl = 1 σl = 2 σl = 3y1 0.3525 0.3030 0.2697y2 0.0199 0.0190 0.0182
y 0.3724 0.3220 0.2879
b 0.2840 0.2712 0.2597
b/y 0.7626 0.8422 0.9020
b¯ 0.3017 0.2975 0.2904
b¯/y 0.8102 0.9239 1.0087
ρ(b¯) 0.6497 0.5731 0.5303
b 0.1960 0.1705 0.1540
effect induced by the underlying change in preferences, both debt statistics are increasing in
σl. A lower labour supply elasticity supports enhanced debt sustainability because it implies
a lower tolerance towards fluctuations in hours worked and hence increased costs of default.
Since default induces increased labour supply (owing to wealth effects) and the post-default
labour allocation is increasing in the level of debt, the same argument also explains why ρ(b¯),
the optimal repayment rate at the fiscal limit, is decreasing in σl.
6 Aggregate Uncertainty
Within the non-stochastic environment studied so far, default never occurs in equilibrium pro-
vided the government’s initial level of liabilities does not exceed the fiscal limit. To address
this concern, we now introduce aggregate uncertainty. Specifically, labour productivity, which
was normalised to A¯ = 1 in the deterministic verion of the model, is now assumed to be subject
to an i.i.d. shock, that is, At = A¯ − εt where εt = 0 with probability 1 − p and εt = 0.2 with
(small) probability p. The negative shock is thus a large but rare event. As the probability
or the magnitude of this negative event converge to zero, the setup with aggregate uncertainty
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degenerates to the deterministic model. Accordingly, we define the risky steady state as the
allocation ‘where agents choose to stay at a given date if they expect future risk and if the
realization of of shocks is zero at this date’ (Coeurdacier, Rey, and Winant, 2011, p.398). Con-
ditional on the negative shock, the value of debt as collateral and liquidity is actually reduced
sufficiently to induce default. Aggregate uncertainty therefore has an immediate implication
on the pricing of government debt and on the government’s optimal debt policy.
The values of endogenous variables in the risky steady state are displayed in Table 6, which
for convenience restates also their deterministic counterparts from Table 3.26 The steady state
Table 6: Steady State Values
Variable Deterministic Risky stst. Risky stst.
stst. (p = 0.01) (p = 0.03)
y1 0.3030 0.3035 0.3042
y2 0.0190 0.0188 0.0186
y 0.3220 0.3223 0.3228
c 0.2578 0.2575 0.2572
g 0.0642 0.0648 0.0656
b 0.2712 0.2688 0.2652
b/y 0.8422 0.8340 0.8214
q 0.9699 0.9665 0.9606
τ 0.2248 0.2252 0.2259
w 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
ρ 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
effects of low-probability default risk have the expected sign but are quantitatively small. In
particular, steady state debt remains sustainable and is only mildly reduced, from 84.2% of
output to 83.4% when p = 0.01 and to 82.1% when p = 0.03. This reduction is the precautionary
response to default risk, which also implies that interest rates on bonds are higher. However,
the increase amounts to only less than half a percentage point when p = 0.01 and to about one
26In the Web Appendix, we provide an equivalent table detailing the simulation means for the same endogenous
variables.
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percentage point when p = 0.03. These premia reflect the haircut and loss of liquidity, but also
the increased collateral value and marginal utility from consumption in the event of default,
which occurs with probability p.
Figure 7 provides further insights into the effects of aggregate uncertainty when p = 0.01.
It plots two families of value functions indexed by the realization of the aggregate shock. The
Figure 7: State-dependent Value Functions
plots confirm that the risky steady state level of debt b∗stoch remains sustainable as long as
ε = 0, whereas the negative shock leads the discretionary government to prefer default. Figure
8 traces the dynamics following a default event (again for p = 0.01). We assume that, in period
0, the economy with initial debt at b∗stoch is hit by the negative shock ε = 0.2. In response, the
government repays only a fraction ρ0 ≈ 0.54 of outstanding debt. The implied haircut is slightly
larger than its deterministic counterpart because of the adverse productivity shock. Default
triggers the government’s temporary exclusion from the bond market. Underlying the dynamics
presented in Figure 8 is a scenario where labour productivity immediately recovers to A¯ = 1,
while the bond market exclusion spell lasts five periods. Thus, public debt has no liquidity value
for an extended period. This has two consequences. First, as the costs of default remain muted,
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(a) Repayment policy and debt-to-GDP (b) Pre- and post-default levels of debt
we observe a pattern of recurrent defaults (compare the value functions plotted in Figure 7).
Second, loans to the government trade only at depressed prices, reflecting the combined effect
of correctly anticipated default and their failure to provide liquidity benefits. The transition
dynamics are driven by the government’s effort to smooth consumption in the face of the
recovery in labour productivity. In detail, period 0 is followed by a two-period transition,
where the government issues a lower and decreasing profile of new liabilities, `1 > `2 = `3 . . . ,
which are repaid at an incomplete but increasing rate (ρ1 ≈ 0.78 and ρ2 ≈ 0.84 = ρ3 . . . ).
The initial default brings effective debt down from 84% to 54% of steady state output; it
then remains constant at this level until the government gets access to the bond market again.
Once this is the case, the government ‘graduates’ from default, i.e., public debt returns to its
stochastic steady state level without further defaults occurring.
In sum, the introduction of aggregate uncertainty renders default an equilibrium event and
implies determinate and recurring haircuts. The prediction of possibly protracted debt resolu-
tion is an aspect linking our theory to the literature on sovereign debt restructuring through
bargaining (cf. Yue, 2010). Otherwise, our main findings from the deterministic setup regarding
40
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bond pricing, steady state, fiscal limit and partial default remain robust to the introduction of
aggregate uncertainty.
7 Conclusion
This paper has provided a quantitative framework to study the joint determinants of government
debt and its sustainability in a closed economy subject to financial frictions. Fiscal policy
is distortionary and implemented under lack of commitment, which may extend also to the
repayment of maturing government debt. Since debt is held domestically, it is valued as an
instrument to smooth consumption, but also as a source of collateral and liquidity. This gives
rise to endogenous default costs whose magnitude varies along with the size of the haircut on
outstanding debt. The existence of a debt Laffer curve induces the government to issue bonds
to a point where marginal debt has negative welfare effects. The model can thus rationalise
substantial steady state debt. When default triggers the government’s temporary exclusion
from the bond market, debt positions in the order of magnitude of annual output remain
sustainable in the face of the option to default. Equilibrium default occurs in response to adverse
productivity shocks and takes the form of a fractional repayment rescaling the government’s
effective liabilities. The model also predicts the possibility of extended periods of recurrent
defaults by governments without access to the bond market.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall the definition of Q(uc, b
′) via the bond pricing function (14),
Q(uc, b
′) = β
uc(b
′)
uc
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
,
and the associated partial derivatives,
Q1(uc, b
′) = −βuc(b
′)
(uc)2
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
,
Q2(uc, b
′) = β
uc(b
′)
uc
(
ucc(b
′)
uc(b′)
cˆb(b
′)
{
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
}
+
{
pˆib(b
′) + φˆb(b′)
})
.
Similarly, from the definition of ω(b, n) in (15),
ω(b, n) =

1 if (1− θ)b > ξcn
(1−θ)b
ξcn
otherwise.
This expression makes clear that ω(b, n) has a kink but remains continuous at the point where
the collateral constraint (4) becomes non-binding. This property is inherited by the other rele-
vant policy functions as well. Moreover, ω(b, n) and the other policy functions are differentiable
everywhere except at this point. With a slight abuse of notation, we thus obtain the partial
derivatives ω1(b, n) = ω2(b, n) = 0 when ω(b, n) = 1, and otherwise
ω1(b, n) =
(1− θ)
ξcn
,
ω2(b, n) = −(1− θ)b
ξcn2
.
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Apart from the non-differentiability at the point where the collateral constraint becomes non-
binding, optimal government behavior under commitment to full debt repayment can be charac-
terised in terms of first-order conditions. Given the additive separability of (1), these conditions
are given by
0 = uc(1 + γ) + γucc(c− (1 + pi)b) + γ(uccQ(uc, b′)b′ + ucQ1(uc, b′)uccb′)− γucpicb− ug
= uc(1 + γ) + γucc(c− (1 + pi)b)− γucpicb− ug,
0 = ul(1 + γ
1
ω(b, n)
)− γull 1
ω(b, n)
n+ γucpinb− ug − γul 1
ω(b, n)2
nω2(b, n),
0 = βVb(b
′) + γ(ucQ2(uc, b′)b′ + ucQ(uc, b′))
= βVb(b
′) + γβuc(b′)
(
1 + pˆi(b′) + φˆ(b′)
)
(1 + εqb′) ,
where εqb′ =
Q2(uc,b′)b′
Q(uc,b′) =
ucc(b′)
uc(b′) cˆb(b
′)b′ + (
pˆib(b
′)+φˆb(b′))b′
(1+pˆi(b′)+φˆ(b′))
. The envelope condition for b is
Vb(b) = −γ
(
uc(1 + pi)− uln
ω(b, n)2
ω1(b, n) + ucpibb
)
+ ugr
= −γ
(
uc(1 + pi)− ul
ω(b, n)2
ω1(b, n){n+ rb}
)
+ ugr.
Substitution into the first-order condition with respect to b′ yields the generalised Euler equation
(17),
γ′
(
u′c(1 + pi
′)− u
′
l
ω(b′, n′)2
ω1(b
′, n′){n′ + rb′}
)
− u′gr = γu′c(1 + pi′ + φ′) (1 + εqb′) .
Proof of Proposition 2. When ξc > 0, government debt is essential for production due to its
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collateral role. Thus, by construction, in the neighborhood of b = 0 welfare is increasing in
debt. When ξc = 0 but r > 0, ω1(b, n) = 0 and the envelope condition for b is
Vb(b) = −γuc(1 + pi) + ugr = −γuc
(
1 +
ul
uc
r
)
+ ugr,
where the second equality follows from pi = ul
uc
r. The first-order condition with respect to n
implies
ug − ul = γ (ul − ulln+ ucpinb) = γ (ul − ull {n+ rb}) ,
where the second equality follows from pin = −ullul pi = −
ull
uc
r. Solving for γ yields
γ =
ug − ul
ul − ull (n+ rb) > 0.
Substituting into the envelope condition and evaluating at b = 0,
Vb(0) = − ug − ul
ul − ullnuc
(
1 +
ul
uc
r
)
+ ugr.
It follows that Vb(0) > 0 if and only if
(
(ul)
2 − ugulln
ul − ulln
)
r >
ug − ul
ul − ullnuc,
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or equivalently,
r >
uguc − uluc
(ul)2 − ugulln =
uc
ul
− uc
ug
ul
ug
− ull
ul
n
=
uc
ul
1− ul
ug
ul
ug
− ull
ul
n
.
Finally, absent financial frictions, that is, when ξc = 0 and r = 0, the envelope condition for b
is unambiguously negative, Vb(b) = −γuc < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. The marginal revenue from issuing additional debt b′ is given by dQ(uc,b
′)b′
db′ =
Q(uc, b
′)
(
1 + Q2(uc,b
′)b′
Q(uc,b′)
)
= Q(uc, b
′) (1 + εqb′). Accordingly, there is a debt Laffer curve when-
ever εqb′ < −1. From the generalised Euler equation (17), −Vb(b′) = γu′c(1 + pi′ + φ′) (1 + εqb′).
Since γu′c(1 + pi
′ + φ′) > 0, it follows that Vb(b′) > 0 if and only if ε
q
b′ < −1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Problem (21) shows that, by choosing ρ, the government can effectively
regulate the state ρb in the value function V˜ d(ρb), subject to the constraint ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Accord-
ingly, as ρ is chosen optimally, the value function V d(b) is non-decreasing over the entire state
space. To see this formally, note that the first-order condition for ρ associated with problem
(21) implies
γ
(
uln
ω(ρb, n)2
ω1(ρb, n)b− ucb
)
≥ 0, (A.1)
with equality in case of an interior solution (recall our earlier comments in the proof of Propo-
sition 1 concerning the differentiability of ω(b, n)). But then the envelope condition associated
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with V˜ d(ρb) implies
V˜ db (ρb) = γ
(
uln
ω(ρb, n)2
ω1(ρb, n)ρ− ucρ
)
= γ
ρ
b
(
uln
ω(ρb, n)2
ω1(ρb, n)b− ucb
)
≥ 0, (A.2)
where the weak inequality follows from (A.1), that is, under the optimal repayment policy
associated with problem (21). It thus follows that V d(b) is non-decreasing.
Returning to (A.1), since ucb > 0, it follows that an interior solution can only arise when
ω1(ρb, n) > 0. The same argument also implies that ω1(ρb, n) > 0 is a necessary condition for
a corner solution at ρ = 1.27 Intuitively, ω1(ρb, n) > 0 is optimal because default destroys the
liquidity value of maturing debt. The optimal default policy is thus left with balancing the
marginal benefits from reduced taxation with the marginal costs from reduced collateral. The
optimal repayment policy conditional on default, ρ˜d(b), therefore ensures that the collateral
constraint is strictly binding. Given ω1(ρb, n) > 0, the envelope condition (A.2) implies
V˜ db (b) = γ
(
uln
ω(ρb, n)2
ω1(ρb, n)ρ− ucρ
)
= γ
(
uln
ω(ρb, n)
1
b
− ucρ
)
.
This expression is monotonically decreasing in b and ρ. Given some ρ, there is thus a unique
b such that V˜ db (b) = 0. Let b denote the level of debt such that V˜
d
b (b) = 0 when ρ = 1. When
ρ = 1 and b < b, V˜ d(b) is increasing; a corner solution at full repayment, ρ˜d(b) = 1, is thus
indeed an optimizing choice, and V d(b) is increasing. Conversely, when ρ = 1 and b > b, V˜ d(b)
is decreasing, which contradicts (A.2); the optimal repayment policy conditional on default is
thus adjusted to an interior solution ρ˜d(b) < 1, and V d(b) is flat. Finally, when b = b, full
27A corner solution at ρ = 0 can never occur because debt is essential for production.
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repayment, ρ˜d(b) = 1, is optimal.
Taking stock, when b < b, V d(b) is strictly increasing. Moreover, at b the collateral constraint
is strictly binding. When b < b, the government always finds it optimal to fully repay its
maturing bonds, ρ˜d(b) = 1. However, due to the market exclusion costs of default, it follows
that V nd(b) > V d(b) = V˜ d(b) for all b < b. By contrast, for any level of debt b > b such that the
government finds it optimal to default, V d(b) is constant, i.e., the value conditional on default
is independent from initial debt. Denote this value by V¯ d. Moreover, under the premise that
the no-default value function V nd(b) is monotonically decreasing for large levels of debt and
hence of an inverse U-shape, there exists a unique level of debt, b¯ > b, such that V nd(b¯) = V¯ d.
By the same argument, V nd(b) ≥ V¯ d for b ≤ b¯, and V nd(b) < V¯ d for b > b¯. Accordingly, the
government fully repays its outstanding bonds up to the threshold level b¯ and partially defaults
if inherited debt exceeds this threshold. This is the optimal (unconditional) repayment policy
associated with problem (19); denote it by ρˆ(b).
In order to explicitly characterise the optimal (unconditional) repayment policy ρˆ(b), recall
first that V nd(b) ≥ V d(b) when b ≤ b¯; hence, ρˆ(b) = 1 for all b ≤ b¯. Conversely, when b > b¯,
V nd(b) < V d(b) and, since b¯ > b, ρˆ(b) = ρ˜d(b) < 1. But this implies that, for b ≥ b, condition
(A.1) holds at equality and ω1(ρb, n) > 0. By the household’s optimal consumption-leisure
choice ul
uc
= (1− τ)ω(ρb, n), so that condition (A.1) implies
ρb =
ul
uc
n
ω(ρb, n)
= (1− τ)n. (A.3)
But for interior solutions ρˆ(b) = ρ˜d(b) < 1, V d(b) = V¯ d is constant; that is, b does not matter
for allocations and welfare, and (1− τ(b))n(b) is constant. It thus follows that the right-hand
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side in (A.3) is constant, implying that ρˆ(b)b must be constant and equal to b for all b that
induce an interior solution for ρ. Since ρ ≤ 1, we thus have ρˆ(b) = b/b for b > b.
Proof of Proposition 5. For the policy P to be sustainable over some region B˜ ⊂ B, the incum-
bent government must find it optimal to employ the policy P and to fully honor inherited debt
for all b ∈ B˜ when it perceives all future governments to employ the policy P and to fully honor
inherited debt in B˜. Absent reputational costs, the incumbent government’s optimal policy
problem is given by
max
c,n,b′,ρ
min
γ
u(c, 1− n, n+ rρb− c) + βV (b′) + γ
(
ucc+ ucQ(uc, b
′)b′ − ul
ω(ρb, n)
n− uc{1 + pi}ρb
)
.
This problem can be decomposed into two stages: First, the government decides on the haircut
on outstanding debt; second, given the haircut, it chooses the remaining policy instruments.
By construction, the solution to the government’s second stage problem is given by the policy
functions P and the corresponding value function V (b). The first stage choice of the optimal
haircut ρˆ(b), in turn, is the solution to
max
ρ∈[0,1]
V (ρb).
Thus, for any region B˜, it is optimal to fully repay debt over the entire region B˜ if and only if
the value function is non-decreasing over the entire region B˜. However, from Proposition 3, if
the value function is non-decreasing in initial debt, this implies that the economy cannot be on
the ‘good’ side of the debt Laffer curve.
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